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Lincoln and Habeas:  Of Merryman and 
Milligan and McCardle 
John Yoo  
Three cases define the Supreme Court’s encounter with the 
Civil War: Ex parte Merryman,1 Ex parte Milligan,2 and Ex parte 
McCardle.3  All three case names bear the styling “ex parte” 
because all three were brought on behalf of citizens detained by 
the armed forces of the Union.  All three detainees sought release 
under the ancient writ of habeas corpus, which requires the 
government to demonstrate to a federal judge the factual and 
legal grounds for detention.4  I will explain why the cases of the 
Civil War did not assume the landmark importance, despite their 
circumstances and language, as a Marbury v. Madison, 
McCullough v. Maryland, or Brown v. Board of Education, but 
instead showed the deferential attitude of the Supreme Court to 
the other branches of the government during wartime. 
Merryman was a Maryland militia officer who had blown up 
railroad bridges between Washington, D.C. and the North, and 
was training secessionist troops in the earliest days of the Civil 
War.5  Milligan was an alleged member of an insurgent force in 
Indiana that was sympathetic to the Confederacy.6  He was tried 
and sentenced by a military commission—an old form of ad hoc 
military court established by commanders for the trial of 
violations of the laws of war and the administration of justice in 
occupied territory.7 
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 1  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
 2  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 3  Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 4  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). 
 5  See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144–46; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 90 (1993) [hereinafter “Paulsen, The Merryman Power”]. 
 6  Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 6. 
 7  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex Parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy 
Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 95–
96, 105–06 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2008). 
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In both Merryman and Milligan, federal courts ordered the 
release of the petitioners on the ground that the military had 
exceeded its constitutional authority.8  Both contained stirring 
language about the vitality of constitutional rights even under 
the pressure of wartime and the need to maintain checks and 
balances on the executive’s wartime powers.9  In Merryman, 
Chief Justice Taney, writing an opinion in chambers, protested 
that the military had arrested suspected Confederates in 
Maryland and refused to recognize civilian authorities without 
the approval of Congress.10  Taney had ordered General George 
Cadwalader, commander of Fort McHenry, to appear in his 
courtroom on May 27, 1861, and to bring the imprisoned 
Merryman with him.11  Cadwalader refused to obey.12  Taney 
held the general in contempt of court, but the U.S. Marshal could 
not gain entry to the fort.13 
Taney then issued an opinion ordering Merryman’s release.14  
The Constitution has “been disregarded and suspended,” Taney 
wrote from his courtroom in Baltimore, “by a military order, 
supported by force of arms.”15  He warned that “if the authority 
which the constitution has confided to the judiciary department 
and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or under any 
circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at its 
discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living 
under a government of laws.”16  Instead, Taney proclaimed, 
“every citizen holds life, liberty and property at the will and 
pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may 
happen to be found.”17  He ordered the opinion and all of the 
proceedings sent to the new President.  “It will then remain for 
that high officer, in fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to 
 
 8  Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147–48, 152; Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 107. 
 9  Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149–50; Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 118–28. 
 10  See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 10 (1991). 
 11  Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. at 146–47.  For some background on John Merryman and the history of the 
case, see JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND 
THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 186–98 (2006) and Arthur T. Downey, The Conflict 
between the Chief Justice and the Chief Executive: Ex Parte Merryman, 31 J. S. CT. HIST. 
262 (2006).  For a useful essay on Milligan, see Bradley, supra note 7.  The cases also 
receive attention in DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003); JAMES G. RANDALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1964) (1951).  On the experience of 
Maryland at the outbreak of the Civil War, see generally DEAN SPRAGUE, FREEDOM 
UNDER LINCOLN 1–44 (1965); Charles B. Clark, Baltimore and the Attack on the Sixth 
Massachusetts Regiment, April 19, 1861, 56 MD.  HIST. MAG. 39 (1961). 
 14  Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146–47. 
 15  Id. at 152. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
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‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine 
what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the 
United States to be respected and enforced.”18 
Milligan, decided five years later, sounded a similar theme.  
Justice Davis declared: “The Constitution of the United States is 
a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, and under all circumstances.”19  Rejecting Attorney 
General Speed’s argument (and Lincoln’s) that the war gave the 
executive branch the right to hold Milligan and try him by a 
military court, the Court responded: “No doctrine, involving more 
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man 
than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of 
the great exigencies of government.”20  Claims to the contrary 
risked “anarchy or despotism,” and led from a false assumption, 
“for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers 
granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as 
has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw 
off its just authority.”21  The Court held that the military could 
not detain and try Milligan in “the theatre of active military 
operations” where “the courts are open, and in the proper and 
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”22  Only if a foreign 
invasion were “actual and present,” rather than threatened, 
could martial law prevail.23 
Nevertheless, neither Merryman nor Milligan has secured a 
place in the firmament of great Supreme Court decisions.  
Merryman remains unknown to almost all but those scholars who 
toil in the academic fields of the separation of powers or the early 
days of the Civil War.24  As we will see, it did little to delay 
Lincoln from ordering the detention of suspected Confederate 
spies, sympathizers, and conspirators behind the Union lines.  
Merryman usually receives attention in work on the early days of 
the Civil War, filled with stories of the struggle between 
Unionists and Southern sympathizers in Maryland and the other 
border states.  Rarely do we learn about the legal response to the 
opinion, which included outright presidential defiance and a 
 
 18  Id. at 153. 
 19  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866). 
 20  Id. at 121. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 127. 
 23  Id. 
 24  For the most penetrating recent work, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994) 
[hereinafter “Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch”] and Paulsen, The Merryman Power, 
supra note 5. 
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critique of the role of the Supreme Court in American society.  
The Merryman opinion itself is rarely reproduced in prominent 
casebooks used for the teaching of constitutional law, which 
usually relegate the case to a one-paragraph note in discussions 
of the debate over judicial review.25 
Milligan, on the other hand, has seen a burst of attention in 
this decade.  This is due entirely to the Bush administration’s 
policies in the War on Terror and the associated cases taken up 
by the Rehnquist Court.26  Aside from this recent interest in the 
decision, Milligan usually goes unexamined and unremembered.  
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham 
Lincoln and Civil Liberties, historian Mark Neely titled a chapter 
“The Irrelevance of the Milligan Decision.”27  Despite the 
opinion’s broad language, for example, military trials continued 
throughout the occupied South.28  As Neely observes, scholars 
were kinder to the decision.29  The first American encyclopedia on 
political science, published in 1881, provides an entry on military 
commissions that holds that they can be used for purposes 
directly contrary to Milligan.30  In 1890, Professor John Burgess 
of Columbia University, the leading political scientist on 
Reconstruction at the turn of the century, wrote: “It is devoutly to 
be hoped that the decision of the Court may never be subjected to 
the strain of actual war.  If, however, it should be, we may safely 
predict that it will necessarily be disregarded.”31 
Remembrance of Merryman and Milligan usually occurs 
during wartime.  Perhaps this should come as no surprise, as 
that is the context within which they were decided.  But they 
usually do not have much effect.  During World War I, neither 
Merryman nor Milligan had any direct relevance because no 
military commissions or detentions occurred on American soil.  
During World War II, the Supreme Court narrowed Milligan to 
its facts.  In Ex parte Quirin,32 the Court upheld the military 
detention and trial of Nazi saboteurs—one of whom was an 
American citizen—on the orders of President Franklin 
Roosevelt.33  According to the unanimous Quirin majority, 
 
 25  See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005) (failing 
to mention Merryman at all). 
 26  See Bradley, supra note 7, at 93. 
 27  NEELY, supra note 10, at160–84. 
 28  Id. at 176–77. 
 29  See id. at 179–81. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 181. 
 32  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 33  Id. at 20, 47; see also David Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. S. CT. HIST. 61 
(1996). 
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Milligan stood for the proposition that the military could not 
apply the laws of war to civilians in areas outside the battlefield 
where the civilian courts remained open.34  But it did not apply to 
those covered by the laws of war, namely combatants.35  The 
Court held: “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the 
armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to 
the law of war.”36  Milligan most notoriously had no effect on the 
Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States, which upheld 
President Roosevelt’s order and Congress’s approval of the 
military detention of about 120,000 Japanese-Americans for their 
suspected disloyalty.37 
Milligan’s lack of relevance has continued to this day.  In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a four-Justice plurality upheld the detention 
of an alleged terrorist, a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan, 
but required judicial review of the detention to protect due 
process standards.38  Nevertheless, the Hamdi plurality 
concluded that Milligan did not require a civilian trial because it 
did not apply to prisoners who had joined or associated 
themselves with enemy forces.39  Both Hamdi, and later Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, take Quirin as the relevant gloss over the original 
Milligan precedent.40  Today’s law schools do only slightly better.  
Most leading casebooks relegate Milligan to summary notes of no 
more than one or two pages.41  Most concentrate on Ex parte 
Quirin, the case of the Nazi saboteurs tried by military 
commission or the enemy combatant cases decided in the last 
four years.42  Professors probably spend more time teaching 
students about the Supreme Court’s protections for the national 
market in milk.43 
McCardle, which provides the epilogue to our story, involved 
a Vicksburg, Mississippi newspaper editor tried by a military 
commission for publishing “incendiary and libelous” articles 
calling for violence against Union authorities.44  Because of 
Milligan, Congress stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in 
McCardle and prevented the Court from reviewing the 
 
 34  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45–46. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 45. 
 37  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944). 
 38  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–10 (2004). 
 39  Id. at 521–22. 
 40  Id. at 522; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590–93 (2006). 
 41  See, e.g., STONE, ET AL., supra note 25, at 386–87, 396–97. 
 42  See, e.g., id. at 383–98 
 43  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 (1981); United 
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934). 
 44  See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
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constitutionality of Military Reconstruction.45  Without going too 
much into the details of McCardle, the decision may help us 
understand why Merryman and Milligan failed to revolutionize 
the judicial role in wartime. 
I. 
Lincoln faced national security challenges that have never 
confronted another American president.  This was true with the 
Civil War in toto, the deadliest, most destructive war in our 
history,46 where American fought American, and brother fought 
brother.  It was also true in the personal sense.  Except for James 
Madison’s flight from the capital in the face of British invaders in 
1814, the nation’s government has never been under the direct 
threat of immediate attack as it was during the Civil War.47  
When the South seceded, Washington, D.C. was the mid-
nineteenth century version of West Berlin—an island of freedom 
surrounded by a sea of enemy territory.  On the one side lay 
Virginia, the very capital of the Confederacy.48  You can see 
General Robert E. Lee’s ancestral home in Arlington from 
downtown Washington.  On the other three sides was Maryland, 
a slave state that had voted for John Breckinridge of Kentucky 
(as had all of the states of the Deep South) in the 1860 election.49  
The only rail links between the North and the nation’s capital 
passed through Maryland.50  Throughout the Civil War, and even 
as late as 1864, Confederate forces would periodically threaten 
the capital with attack.51 
That precarious strategic situation made it imperative that 
the Union secure the Border States such as Maryland.  Lincoln 
reportedly said, for example, that while he welcomed God’s 
support, he must have Kentucky’s.52  He could just as easily have 
said that of Maryland.  It was the necessity to ensure that 
Maryland remained in the Union that led to Merryman.53  When 
Fort Sumter fell, it appeared to Northerners that Maryland 
might join the states of the upper South in secession.54  Sumter 
 
 45  Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional Power 
to Remove Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (2007). 
 46  See C. Vann Woodward, Editor’s Introduction to JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE 
CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA xvii, xviii–xix (1988). 
 47  See MCPHERSON, supra note 46, at 285–86. 
 48  Id. at 284–85. 
 49  See id. at 230, 232, 284–85. 
 50  Id. at 284–85, 287. 
 51  See generally id. 
 52  CHARLES PIERCE ROLAND, AN AMERICAN ILIAD: THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 42 
(2002). 
 53  See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 24, at 278. 
 54  NEELY, supra note 10, at 4. 
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surrendered on April 14, 1861; the next day Lincoln issued a 
proclamation requesting 75,000 volunteers to suppress the 
rebellion and enforce federal law.55  Lincoln’s intention to use 
force to compel the Southern states to return to the Union 
prompted Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to 
secede.56  Sentiment to follow their example in Maryland was 
strong.  Maryland’s governor and Baltimore’s mayor telegraphed 
Lincoln to warn him to “[s]end no troops here.”57  Lincoln even 
had to travel secretly through Baltimore on his way to his 
inauguration.58 
Maryland’s resistance quickly turned violent.  Rushing to 
defend Washington, D.C. on April 19, the Sixth Massachusetts 
regiment was attacked by a secessionist mob as it switched 
railroad lines in Baltimore.59  Four soldiers and a dozen civilians 
were killed.60  For the following week, Maryland rebels succeeded 
in isolating the capital from the North.61  The mayor and chief of 
police in Baltimore ordered the destruction of the railroad 
bridges running to the North.62  Secessionists cut the telegraph 
lines between the North and the capital.63  Washington officials 
expected a Confederate attack on the defenseless capital at any 
moment.64  It was not until April 25 that reinforcements from 
New York arrived, and only then by bypassing Baltimore to the 
east.65 
Meanwhile, Lincoln and his advisors worried about how to 
keep Maryland in the Union.66  At first, Lincoln presented his 
homespun humor, but within it was a steely determination.  On 
April 22, when a delegation of the Baltimore YMCA came to see 
him and asked that he stop federal troop movements and make 
peace with the Confederacy, Lincoln exclaimed that they “would 
have me break my oath and surrender the Government without a 
blow.  There is no Washington in that—no Jackson in that—no 
manhood nor honor in that.”67  He explained that in order to 
 
 55  Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress, (Apr. 15, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 331–32 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953); DAVID 
HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 296 (1995). 
 56  MCPHERSON, supra note 46, at 278–82. 
 57 DONALD, supra note 55, at 297. 
 58  Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 90. 
 59  MCPHERSON, supra note 46, at 285. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  DONALD, supra note 55, at 299. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Reply to Baltimore Committee (Apr. 22, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 341–42. 
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defend the capital, Union troops must cross Maryland.  “Our men 
are not moles, and can’t dig under the earth; they are not birds, 
and can’t fly through the air. . . . Keep your rowdies in 
Baltimore,” he warned, “and there will be no bloodshed.”68  
Lincoln took a prudent attitude toward the Maryland state 
government.  When the Maryland legislature met on April 26, 
General Winfield Scott proposed to arrest them rather than let 
them secede.69  Lincoln, however, ordered him off to await the 
outcome of their deliberations; if they did vote to secede, he 
ordered Scott “to the bombardment of their cities—and in the 
extremist necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus.”70  Lincoln’s April 25 order appears to be the first official 
mention of the idea of suspending the writ, and its tie to the 
other option of bombarding Maryland cities reflects the extreme 
pressures on the President.  Luckily, the legislature did 
nothing.71 
Nevertheless, concerns about rebel marauders and the 
security of the rail link between Washington and Maryland led 
Lincoln to take that step of “extremist necessity” just two days 
later.  In an order to General Scott, the President declared:  
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the 
United States.  If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line, 
which is now used between the City of Philadelphia and the City of 
Washington . . . you find resistance which renders it necessary to 
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you, 
personally . . .  are authorized to suspend that writ.72 
Scott immediately authorized the commanders in Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Delaware, and Washington to suspend the writ if 
necessary.73  Neither Lincoln nor Scott publicized the order, nor 
did they issue it as a public proclamation, nor was it sent to the 
courts or Congress at the time.74  Lincoln would publicly suspend 
the writ in Florida in a public proclamation on May 10.75 
John Merryman was one of the Maryland citizens swept up 
by Union troops after the suspension of habeas corpus.76  He was 
 
 68  Id. 
 69  DONALD, supra note 55, at 299. 
 70  Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 25, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 344. 
 71  DONALD, supra note 55, at 299. 
 72  Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 347. 
 73  1 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE 
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 567–68 (Nat’l Historical Soc’y, 2d ser. 1971) (1894). 
 74  NEELY, supra note 10, at 9. 
 75  Proclamation Suspending Writ of Habeas Corpus in Florida (May 10, 1861), in 4 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 364–65. 
 76  DONALD, supra note 55, at 299. 
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a farmer, state legislator, and an officer in the Maryland 
militia.77  Union officers accused him of drilling a secessionist 
cavalry unit that had participated in the destruction of the 
railroad bridges and telegraph lines leading to the North in 
April.78  Troops arrested him at his home on May 25, 1861 and 
imprisoned him at Fort McHenry.79  Merryman immediately 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus directly with Chief Justice 
Taney in chambers at the Supreme Court, rather than to the 
federal court in Baltimore.80  In one of those happy historical 
coincidences, historian Carl Swisher reports that Merryman’s 
father and Taney had gone to Dickinson College together.81  Chief 
Justice Taney, of course, was a Marylander who had become 
Andrew Jackson’s Attorney General and then Secretary of the 
Treasury during the great Bank War.82  As Chief Justice, he 
wrote the majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, which, by 
holding the Compromise of 1850 unconstitutional, hastened the 
coming of the Civil War.83 
Taney moved with alacrity to defend Merryman’s rights, but 
with little success.  He personally rushed to Baltimore to take up 
the case rather than wait in the capital.  The very next day, he 
issued a writ to General George Cadwalader, commander of Fort 
McHenry, to appear before him and to bring Merryman with 
him.84 
Cadwalader was no simple-minded soldier, but the son of a 
distinguished Philadelphia family.85  Law and War ran in his 
blood.  He was a peculiar American breed of soldier-lawyer in the 
tradition of Colonel Alexander Hamilton and General Henry 
Halleck.  His grandfather, John Cadwalader, was a brigadier-
general in command of Pennsylvania troops during the 
Revolutionary War.86  He had served under Washington at the 
battles of Trenton and Princeton.87  He was supposed to support 
Washington’s crossing of the Delaware, but couldn’t get his 
 
 77  Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 90. 
 78  Id. 
 79  CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, 5 THE OLIVER WENDELL DEVISE: 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 844 (1974). 
 80  See NEELY, supra note 10, at 10. 
 81 SWISHER, supra note 79, at 845. 
 82  BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 7–8, 100–02, 144 (Gaunt, Inc. reprint 1997). 
 83  Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How it 
Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 13 (2007). 
 84  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 146 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
 85  See generally The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Collection 1454, 
Cadwalader Family Papers (2007), available at http://www.hsp.org/files/ 
findingaid1454cadwaladerpart1.pdf. 
 86  Id. at 2–3. 
 87  Id. at 3. 
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artillery across the frozen river.88  His father, Thomas 
Cadwalader, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania, 
entered the bar, and reached the rank of major general in 
command of the First Division of the Pennsylvania militia during 
the War of 1812.89  The pressure was on for son George.  Born in 
Philadelphia in 1806, he went to Penn like his father, graduated 
at the ripe old age of 17, and was later admitted to the bar.90  He 
became a general and served with distinction in the Mexican-
American War of 1848.91  His brother was a federal district judge 
in Philadelphia at the outbreak of the Civil War.92 
Cadwalader sent an aide to Taney’s courtroom in full 
military regalia to notify the Chief Justice that neither he nor 
Merryman would appear.93  The aide relayed Cadwalader’s 
response, that “he is duly authorized by the president of the 
United States . . . to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, for the 
public safety.”94  Although a “high and delicate trust,” and one to 
be exercised “with judgment and discretion,” the General claimed 
his instructions were “that in times of civil strife, errors, if any, 
should be on the side of the safety of the country.”95  He asked for 
a postponement of the proceedings until he could receive 
instructions from President Lincoln.96  Taney instead issued an 
immediate contempt order against Cadwalader.97  But the U.S. 
Marshal was denied entry at the gate of the fort.98 
Taney was left to issue an opinion, which sought to pull the 
heart out of Lincoln’s energetic response to the fall of Fort 
Sumter.  The Constitution’s discussion of the suspension occurs 
in one sentence, in Article I, Section 9, and it does so in the 
passive voice: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”99  Taney held that the 
Suspension Clause’s placement in the Article where Congress’s 
powers lay, and judicial commentary since ratification, 
 
 88  Id. at 3–4. 
 89  Id. at 3–4. 
 90  Id. at 5; see also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A POLITICAL 
SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 335 (David Stephen Heidler, Jeanne T. Heidler, & David 
J. Coles eds., 2000). 
 91  The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, supra note 85, at 5. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 146 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); see also 
Swisher, supra note 79, at 845. 
 94  Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 147. 
 99  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9. 
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recognized that only Congress could suspend the writ.100  If 
military detention without trial were permitted to continue, 
Taney wrote, “the people of the United States are no longer living 
under a government of laws.”101  Without congressional 
suspension, “every citizen holds life, liberty and property at the 
will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he 
may happen to be found.”102  Taney’s opinion not only found 
Lincoln’s suspension unconstitutional, but it clearly questioned 
the legal bases for Lincoln’s other unilateral responses to 
secession, such as the calling up of volunteers, the imposition of a 
blockade on Southern ports, and the withdrawal of funds from 
the Treasury to raise an army.103 
Taney’s decision in Merryman was not just an attack on 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, but upon the President’s right to 
interpret the Constitution.  Lincoln had come to office criticizing 
the Supreme Court for its decision in Dred Scott.104  During the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates, he had argued that the Court’s decision 
only applied to slave and owner in the case itself, and not to any 
other cases.105  In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln declared 
that “if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, 
affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions 
of the Supreme Court the people will have ceased, to be their own 
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their 
government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”106  The 
Court had lost immense prestige, at least with Republicans, who 
rejected the idea of judicial supremacy behind the decision in 
Dred Scott and suspected the federal courts of supporting slavery 
and the South.107 
For Taney, however, the President’s oath to uphold the 
Constitution required him to carry out the Supreme Court’s 
orders.108  The Merryman decision was another declaration of 
judicial supremacy in interpreting the Constitution, to be 
expected of the Justice who wrote Dred Scott, though perhaps not 
from President Andrew Jackson’s former attorney general.  
Taney clearly wanted to dramatize the conflict between the 
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President and the judiciary.  He appeared before a crowd at the 
Baltimore courthouse to receive General Cadwalader’s response, 
and declared that the general was defying the law and that he 
too might be under military arrest soon.109 
Public response to Chief Justice Taney’s decision in the 
North was, for the most part, withering.  “The Chief Justice takes 
sides with traitors, throwing around them the sheltering 
protection of the ermine,” thundered the New York Tribune, 
probably the North’s most influential newspaper.110 “When 
treason stalks abroad in arms, let decrepit Judges give place to 
men capable of detecting and crushing it.”111  It claimed that 
Taney had engaged in “a gross perversion of [the Court’s] powers 
to employ [the writ of habeas corpus] as the protecting shield of 
rebels against a constitutional government.”112  It concluded that 
“[n]o Judge whose heart was loyal to the Constitution would have 
given such aid and comfort to public enemies.”113  Nor did The 
New York Times display much charity to the elderly Chief 
Justice: “Too feeble to wield the sword against the Constitution, 
too old and palsied and weak to march in the ranks of rebellion 
and fight against the Union, he uses the powers of his office to 
serve the cause of the traitors.”114  A few Republican organs 
supported Taney, concluding that although Lincoln’s actions may 
be necessary, the Court should not bless them, but instead 
should enter the violation of the Constitution on the record, “to 
stand as a warning, in more peaceful times yet to come, that here 
is an act, the necessity of which was the justification, and which 
is not to be made a precedent at any time when the public 
exigency is less pressing.”115 
Lincoln answered Taney, and the widespread claims of 
executive dictatorship, in his message to the special session of 
Congress on July 4, 1861.116  Lincoln stressed that the 
Confederacy had fired the first shot before Lincoln or the 
national government had taken any action that might threaten 
slavery.117  The South’s action, therefore, was not the response to 
any unconstitutional action of the government, but an effort to 
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overturn the results of democratic elections and a rejection of the 
constitutional processes of “time, discussion, and the ballot 
box.”118  In response, Lincoln argued, “no choice was left but to 
call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist force, 
employed for its destruction, by force, for its preservation.”119  
Lincoln claimed he had responded with the support of public 
opinion: “These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were 
ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, 
and a public necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress 
would readily ratify them.”120  Lincoln avoided the question 
whether he had acted unconstitutionally, but justified his actions 
on Congress’s political support after the fact: “It is believed that 
nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of 
Congress.”121  That summer, Congress enacted a statute, not 
explicitly authorizing war against the South, but rather declaring 
that Lincoln’s actions taken that spring “respecting the army and 
navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the 
militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in 
all respects legalized and made valid, . . . as if they had been 
issued and done” by Congress.122 
Lincoln directly responded to the Chief Justice too, but not 
by name.  He acknowledged that the “legality and propriety” of 
the suspension has been questioned, and that the “attention of 
the country” had been directed to his presidential duty “to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”123  He made a nod 
toward the idea that the government could violate a single law, if 
that act would save the country: “Are all the laws, but one, to go 
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one 
be violated?”124  Lincoln argued that he would break his oath to 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution if he blindly 
obeyed one provision above the survival of the Republic.125  But 
Lincoln was too good a lawyer to rely solely on claims of a 
Lockean prerogative.126  He claimed that the Suspension Clause’s 
passive tense left open the question of who could suspend the 
writ:  
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[A]s the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it 
cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended, that in 
every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be 
called together; the very assembling of which might be prevented . . . 
by the rebellion.127 
Lincoln promised a legal opinion from Attorney General 
Bates to provide a more complete justification,128 which was 
issued the next day.129  Drawing on The Federalist, Bates’s 
opinion argued that each branch of the government was co-
ordinate and could independently exercise its unique 
constitutional powers free from the orders of the other.130 
Taney lost his confrontation with Lincoln.  The 
administration continued the system of military detentions.  
Later that summer, Lincoln ordered the detention of Maryland 
legislators, the step he would not take in April.131  In October, the 
administration expanded the authority of generals to suspend 
habeas corpus from Washington all the way up “the military line” 
to Maine.132  Lincoln delegated to Secretary of State William 
Seward the supervision of military arrests in the first year of the 
war.133  Seward allegedly told the British ambassador to the 
United States that he could “ring a [little] bell on his desk” and 
arrest any citizen in the nation—”[c]ould even the Queen of 
England do as much?”134  Despite this anecdote, the most reliable 
estimates indicate that the government detained 864 civilians—
approximately half were from the border states, while a third 
were Southerners—until the War Department took over 
detentions in 1862.135  President Lincoln would suspend habeas 
nationwide on September 24, 1862, two days after releasing the 
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, in a move to prevent 
opposition to the first conscription law.136  Congress did not enact 
a law authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus and 
instituting a system of review until March 3, 1863, finally curing 
the defect claimed by Milligan.137  Historian James G. Randall, 
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author of the widely read Constitutional Problems Under 
Lincoln, estimated that the Lincoln administration detained 
approximately 13,500 civilian prisoners.138  Neely’s more recent 
work puts the number at about 12,600, though the records are 
incomplete.139 
Supporters of the Union came to believe that these measures 
saved Maryland from secession.140  Merryman had become a 
footnote to the start of the war, rather than a landmark for the 
development of internal security policies during the War.141  
Writing on Merryman, Harvard historian Charles Warren 
observed that the lack of popular support for the Court depressed 
the Chief Justice.142  Writing in 1863, Taney despaired that the 
Court would not “ever be again restored to the authority and 
rank which the Constitution intended to confer upon it.”143  He 
concluded that the “supremacy of the military power over the 
civil seems to be established, and the public mind has acquiesced 
in it and sanctioned it.”144  Nevertheless, Warren argued, if 
Taney had lived another four years, he would have seen his 
opinion followed to the full in Ex parte Milligan.  “Never did a 
fearless Judge receive a more swift or more complete 
vindication,” Warren wrote.145 
But did he? 
II. 
Milligan was not just a vindication of Merryman, but a 
dramatic expansion of it.  Merryman had demanded that 
Congress suspend the writ of habeas corpus.146  Milligan 
addressed a broader question: even if the writ were suspended, 
can the President and Congress subject civilians behind the lines 
to military trials when the civilian courts are open and 
functioning?147  Unlike Merryman, Milligan did not reach the 
Justices under the pressure of secession and sabotage, but came 
up after the assassination of President Lincoln and Lee’s 
surrender at Appomattox.148  Yet Milligan drove the courts into 
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conflict once more with the political branches; this time not with 
the President, but with Congress. 
Milligan took place in the midst of inter-branch strife over 
Reconstruction.149  The issues were complex, and centrally 
involved the Constitution.  If the Confederacy were considered an 
enemy nation, the laws of war permitted recaptured territory to 
be subject to occupation by Union military authorities.150  But if 
the Southern states had never left the Union, as Lincoln had 
argued from the beginning, then they could claim an immediate 
restoration of their political rights.151  They could again pass 
their own laws, run their own courts and police, and exercise 
their rights in the federal government, which could have included 
voting on the appropriations for the army and blocking 
legislation to protect the new freedmen.  In the unprecedented 
circumstances of the Civil War, there were no rules for the re-
admission of rebellious states to the Union or how much 
authority the national government could exercise in occupied 
territory.152 
Milligan came to the Court just as President Johnson and 
radical Republicans in Congress were reaching their fateful split 
over Reconstruction policy.  Johnson sought relatively lenient 
conditions for re-admission of the Southern states to the Union.  
He declared the war over in December 1865 and allowed 
Southern states to re-establish governments, sometimes with 
former Confederates in positions of power.153  Johnson also 
offered amnesty to those who swore an oath of loyalty to the 
Union.154  He did not demand of the Southern states any more 
protections for the freedmen than ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment—meaning that the rights of the former slaves would 
be governed by state law—and did not require states to grant 
them suffrage.155  Southern states responded by adopting new 
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constitutions that recognized the end of slavery, but little more.  
Their legislatures quickly enacted “Black Codes” which sought to 
keep the freedmen in a state of second-class citizenship by 
restricting their economic and political rights.156  They held 
elections that sent Congressmen and Senators, including former 
Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens and former 
generals and officials of the Confederacy, to the sitting of the 
39th Congress in December 1865.157  Johnson sought a swift 
reunion of the sundered Union by using the powers of Lincoln’s 
energetic executive, which would set Reconstruction policy, to 
restore the respect for state sovereignty of the antebellum 
Constitution. 
Congress would have little of it and refused to seat the 
elected representatives of the new Southern governments.158  
Radical Republicans wanted to provide the freedmen with a level 
of economic and political equality denied them by the Southern 
governments.  In April 1866, Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
and Freedman Bureau bills over President Johnson’s veto.159  
Radicals also believed that military government had to continue 
in the South because Union troops were the surest guarantee for 
the security and rights of the freedmen when state governments 
in the South could not be trusted.160  President Johnson went to 
the country to oppose the radicals, but the 1866 midterm 
elections gave them a tremendous victory.161  In less than two 
years, they would use their majority to place the South under 
military government, strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, 
and bring Johnson within one vote in the Senate of being the 
only President impeached and removed from office.162 
Milligan came to the Court in the midst of this strife, and 
had a significant impact on the struggle, but its origins reached 
back two years to the tentative months when Abraham Lincoln’s 
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re-election had been in doubt.163  Lambdin Milligan was an 
Indiana Copperhead Democrat who wanted peace with the 
Confederacy.164  In an odd coincidence he had joined the Ohio Bar 
and placed first in the same examination as Edwin Stanton, who 
would become Lincoln’s Secretary of War and would approve 
Milligan’s detention and conviction.165  Milligan fervently 
believed that secession was legal and that Lincoln and the Union 
had overstepped their constitutional authority in waging the 
Civil War.166  He took an active role in Democratic politics in 
Indiana and ran for the party’s 1864 nomination for governor, 
but his strict anti-war position lost.167 
His opposition apparently went beyond political measures.  
Milligan organized the secret Democrat society, known as the 
Order of American Knights, or the Sons of Liberty.168  With 
Indianapolis printer Harrison Horton Dodd as the Grand 
Commander, Milligan was appointed a “major general” of the 
Sons of Liberty along with a few other prominent Democrats in 
the state.169  Although they planned attacks on prisoner of war 
camps, rebellion against Union authority, and establishment of 
an independent Northwestern Confederacy, none of these plans 
came to fruition.170  That did not stop Dodd, however, from 
accepting money from Confederate spies in Canada to pay for the 
planned revolt.171  Acting on a tip by an informant, Union officers 
found 400 revolvers and ammunition at Dodd’s printing shop.172 
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The conspiracy suited the needs of the powerful Republican 
Governor, Oliver Morton.  Worried about his re-election and the 
fate of the Republican Party in the 1864 elections, Morton 
ordered the arrest of Milligan and his fellow conspirators.173 
Morton appears to have urged a military trial because its 
proceedings would run through the election season.174  
Successfully draping Indiana Democrats in the mantle of 
disloyalty, Morton won re-election by a comfortable margin in 
October,175 as did Lincoln in November,176 no doubt helped more 
by Sherman’s capture of Atlanta than anything.177 
At the end of the proceedings, a military commission of seven 
army officers convicted four of the conspirators.178  It sentenced 
three of them, including Milligan, to death.179  It had not helped 
that the ringleader, Dodd, escaped from his room above the post-
office and made it to Canada, and that one of Milligan’s comrades 
had turned informant.180  With his re-election secure, however, 
Governor Morton decided to recommend commutation of their 
sentences to the military authorities, who remained unmoved.181  
His opponent in the election, Democrat Joseph E. McDonald, a 
former congressman and state attorney general, journeyed to 
Washington to personally meet with Lincoln to plead for 
clemency.182  Lincoln read over the trial record, found some 
errors, and told McDonald that there would be “such a jubilee 
over yonder” in Virginia—anticipating Lee’s surrender to 
Grant—that “we shall none of us want any more killing done.”183  
He promised McDonald, “I will still keep them in prison awhile to 
keep them from killing the new government.”184  Lincoln’s 
assassination on Good Friday, April 14, 1865, prevented him 
from keeping his promise.185  President Johnson, who had 
convened a military commission to quickly try and execute the 
assassins, was in no mood for mercy and approved the death 
sentences of Milligan and his co-defendants.186 
 
 173  Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 107–08. 
 174  See Stampp, supra note 163, at 51–52. 
 175  See Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 110. 
 176  Id. at 113. 
 177  DONALD, supra note 55, at 531. 
 178  See Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 108, 114. 
 179  Id. at 459. 
 180  Id. at 458. 
 181  Id. at 459–60. 
 182  Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 104; see also IND. 
REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. COMM., OLIVER P. MORTON OF INDIANA: SKETCH OF HIS LIFE 
AND PUBLIC SERVICE 48 (1876) (detailing the re-election of Governor Morton). 
 183  FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 197. 
 184  Id.  
 185  See id.; DONALD, supra note 55, at 596–99. 
 186  FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 196–97. 
YOO 10/14/2009 6:52 PM 
524 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:505 
On May 10, Milligan filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
federal circuit court in Indianapolis.187  The next day, the two 
federal judges on circuit—Justice David Davis and Judge David 
McDonald—sent a remarkable letter to the President.188  They 
asked that Johnson delay execution of the sentence until the 
federal courts had time to determine whether military 
commissions had jurisdiction over civilians unconnected to the 
military.189  Unlike Chief Justice Taney, they did not appear to 
believe that they had the authority to order the President to 
suspend the executions.  Instead, they argued that allowing the 
executions would open the government to the charge of 
oppression and would be a stain on the national character.190  
They also doubted the wisdom of the policy.  The judges did not 
question “the guilt of these men” or “that their trial had a most 
salutary effect on the public mind by developing and defeating a 
most dangerous and wicked conspiracy against our 
government.”191  Rather, they argued that the trial had achieved 
its purpose and that Indiana was now “quiet and peaceable.”192  
Executing Milligan and his comrades now would only make them 
“political martyrs.”193  Stanton also put in a plea for his former 
bar mate.194  Johnson ultimately commuted Milligan’s sentence 
to life imprisonment.195 
The two judges on the circuit sent the case to the Supreme 
Court, which heard oral arguments on March 5, 1866.196  
Milligan’s counsel added three shrewdly chosen co-counsel: 
Jeremiah Black, who had been Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, Attorney General and Secretary of State in the 
Buchanan administration, and had been defeated for 
confirmation to the Supreme Court in 1861 by one vote;197 James 
A. Garfield, a brigadier general during the opening years of the 
Civil War at age 31, Republican congressman from Ohio, and 
future President;198 and David Dudley Field, brother of sitting 
Justice Stephen J. Field and father of the Field Code that would 
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be the basis of American civil procedure in the nineteenth 
century.199  As Milligan’s chances rose with these choices, the 
government’s odds dropped with its own.  In addition to Attorney 
General James Speed, who was not thought of as an able oral 
advocate,200 the government added Henry Stanbery, who would 
replace Speed as Attorney General that summer and would be 
nominated by Johnson to a seat on the Supreme Court;201 and, 
inexplicably, General Benjamin Butler, a Massachusetts lawyer 
who had won notoriety for his tough occupation government of 
the City of New Orleans.202  Butler, for example, had issued 
General Order No. 28 that declared that any woman who showed 
disrespect to a Union soldier or officer would be treated as “a 
woman of the town plying her avocation.”203  He would be known 
as “Beast Butler” throughout the South for decades.204  After an 
unsuccessful military career, Butler would be elected to the 
House of Representatives and would be the lead House 
prosecutor of the Johnson impeachment before the Senate.205 
The transcript of oral argument is lengthy, occupying sixty-
two pages of the U.S. Reports.206  Each side received three hours 
of time; not exactly the days accorded Daniel Webster, but a 
luxury under today’s standards.207  On April 3, 1866, the Court 
announced that it was ordering the release of Milligan, who went 
free on April 10.208  However, the Court did not release its 
opinion until December.209  Justice Davis wrote for the Court that 
these new tribunals had no jurisdiction over a citizen who was 
not a resident of one of the rebellious states, not a prisoner of 
war, and not in the armed forces of the Confederacy or the 
Union.210  The law of war, which applied to combatants and the 
battlefield, held no sway over “citizens in states which have 
upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts 
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are open and their process unobstructed.”211  The Bill of Rights 
demanded that Milligan receive a jury trial in federal court for 
violations of civilian law, and these provisions could not be 
waived in the face of emergency.212  “Wicked men, ambitious of 
power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the 
place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right 
is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the 
dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate.”213  
Neither the President nor Congress, therefore, could impose 
martial law that overrode the constitutional protections in a 
criminal trial, except in cases of actual invasion in which the 
“courts and civil authorities are overthrown.”214  What was good 
for the occupation of Virginia, Davis concluded, was not good for 
Indiana.215 
Chief Justice Chase wrote a concurring opinion joined by 
three other Justices.216  He found that Milligan fell within the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which had authorized Lincoln to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.217  The Act required the 
military to supply the courts with lists of prisoners, and to 
release the prisoners if a grand jury did not choose to indict them 
of a crime.218  Milligan had not been indicted by a grand jury, so 
he was entitled under the statute to go free.  Chase refused to 
reach the question of whether the President and Congress 
together could authorize the use of military commissions in 
wartime: “When the nation is involved in war, and some portions 
of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is 
within the power of Congress to determine in what states or 
districts such great and imminent public danger exists as 
justifies the authorization of military tribunals.”219  Chase would 
have allowed Congress to authorize military tribunals in wartime 
even when the courts were open; a necessity, he argued, because 
the courts might prove incompetent to stop threatened danger or 
judicial officers might be aligned with the rebels.220 
It was not the judgment in Milligan that was particularly 
objectionable, but rather the reasoning of the Court’s opinion.  
Congress’s authority was not directly presented in Milligan.  
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Justice Davis’s desire to address its scope, and to limit it in such 
broad terms, immediately plunged the Court into the maelstrom 
of Reconstruction politics. When the Court announced the 
opinion in December, its implications for congressional plans for 
Reconstruction were obvious to all.  Milligan suggested that any 
continuation of military occupation in the South was 
unconstitutional, and signaled that Republicans would have to 
count the judiciary among their opponents.221  The Republicans 
immediately recognized Milligan as a challenge, with Thaddeus 
Stevens declaring it to be a “most injurious and iniquitous 
decision [that] has rendered immediate action by Congress upon 
the question of the establishment of governments in the rebel 
States absolutely indispensable.”222  “In the conflict of principle 
thus evoked, the States which sustained the cause of the Union 
will recognize an old foe with a new face,” wrote The New York 
Times.223  “The Supreme Court, we regret to find, throws the 
great weight of its influence into the scale of those who assailed 
the Union and step after step impugned the constitutionality of 
nearly everything that was done to uphold it.”224  Comparing 
Milligan to Dred Scott, Harper’s Weekly declared that the 
decision “is not a judicial opinion; it is a political act.”225  The 
New York Herald raised the idea of reforming the Court: “a 
reconstruction of the Supreme Court, adapted to the paramount 
decisions of the war, looms up into bold relief, on a question of 
vital importance.”226 
Just as Republican papers attacked Milligan, Democratic 
papers praised it.  The National Intelligencer, which often 
represented the views of the Johnson administration, attacked 
the Court’s critics: “[A]s in war times, these monopolists of 
patriotism denounced those who upheld the sacred liberties of 
the citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution, so now, in the 
midst of peace, they assail those who maintain the rights of the 
States as guaranteed by that same instrument.”227  Democrats in 
Congress similarly interpreted Milligan as requiring a quick re-
admission of the Southern States to the Union and decried the 
Republican vitriol hurled at the Court.  Aaron Harding criticized 
the Republicans for their “attempt to bring into ridicule and 
contempt the last refuge of liberty [the Supreme Court] for the 
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oppressed.”228  Michael Kerr went further, accusing the 
Republicans in Congress of attempting to “govern this country 
without the aid of the unrepresented States, the Constitution, or 
the Supreme Court.”229  It was no favor to the Supreme Court 
when, on the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans, it was 
toasted at a Democratic party dinner as “the great conservative 
power of the government; never more needed or better 
appreciated than now.”230  Johnson’s annual message to 
Congress, delivered in December 1866, had asked for the 
immediate re-admission of the Southern states because they had 
met his condition of adopting the Thirteenth Amendment.231  The 
new Republican majorities ignored him.  Now Johnson and his 
Democrat allies sought to project the image that the Court was 
on their side. 
The possibility that the Court would throw its weight behind 
Johnson worried congressional Republicans.  They nonetheless 
proceeded with their plans for Reconstruction and, on March 2, 
1867, passed a Reconstruction Act that required the adoption of 
black suffrage, new constitutions adopted by majority vote, and 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment before the Southern 
states would regain their representation in Congress.232  To 
guarantee the equal rights of the freedmen, Congress created five 
military districts in the former Confederacy to provide military 
protection.233  The army would have the duty to protect all 
persons, to suppress insurrections, disorder, and violence, and to 
punish those who disturbed the peace.234  A supplementary Act 
gave the military commanders the authority to remove state 
officers who impeded Reconstruction.235  Johnson vetoed the Act 
and in his message argued that with the surrender of the 
Confederacy, the war powers of the government had ended, and 
the Southern states had resumed their place in the constitutional 
structure.236  He also claimed that military occupation of the 
South violated Milligan.237  Congress overrode Johnson’s veto on 
the very same day by far more than the two-thirds majorities 
required: 135 to 48 in the House, and 38 to 10 in the Senate.238 
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Enforcement of the Reconstruction Act produced the first 
demonstration of Milligan’s desuetude as military commissions 
continued in the South.  From the end of the war until January 1, 
1869, the Union army conducted 1,435 military trials, though 
they steadily declined throughout this period.239  Some of them 
involved cases from the war, some from Reconstruction; some 
were of Southern civilians, some were of Union soldiers.  The 
Reconstruction Act allowed military commanders to use 
commissions to try civilians when the civilian courts were 
thought to be inadequate.  Military governors became embroiled 
in reviewing state enforcement of the laws governing everyday 
life.  They suspended various laws, such as debt collection, that 
were being enforced in a discriminatory manner by state officials, 
and substituted military enforcement when state authorities 
applied criminal and civil laws unjustly.  This state of affairs did 
not end until all of the Southern states rejoined the Union.240  
Some lower federal courts relied upon Milligan to stop these 
military commission trials, but the record shows that they were 
unsuccessful in preventing their widespread use in the South.241 
In the first year of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court 
studiously refused to entertain cases by states, such as 
Mississippi and Georgia, challenging the constitutionality of 
military government in the South.242  One might say that 
Congress had even sought the cooperation of the other two 
branches in Reconstruction—the reliance on military governors 
recognized President Johnson’s paramount role, and Congress 
had expanded habeas jurisdiction in a February 1867 law 
designed to allow freedmen to seek the protection of the federal 
courts.243  But that changed with the case of Ex parte 
McCardle.244  Colonel William McCardle, the editor of the 
Vicksburg Times, vituperatively attacked Reconstruction.  In one 
editorial he called the military governors “each and all infamous, 
cowardly, and abandoned villains,” and in others he called for 
resistance to the military, Southern government by whites only, 
and opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment.245  Union officers 
arrested McCardle on November 8, 1867, and brought him before 
a military commission to face trial for inciting insurrection, 
 
 239  NEELY, supra note 10, at 176–77. 
 240  Id. at 178–79. 
 241  See 3 WARREN, supra note 142, at 164–65. 
 242  See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dismissed as 
political question); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867) (same). 
 243  Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). 
 244  74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 245  SCHWARTZ, supra note 232, at 140; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to 
Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 236 n.42 (1973). 
YOO 10/14/2009 6:52 PM 
530 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:505 
disorder, and violence and impeding Reconstruction.246  When the 
federal district court denied McCardle’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, he appealed to the Supreme Court under the new 
1867 habeas law.247 
When the Supreme Court announced that it would hear Ex 
parte McCardle in January 1868, it was apparent that a test of 
the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Act was on the way. 248  
It was no coincidence that McCardle was represented by 
Milligan’s lawyers.249  The Johnson administration made its 
views known by refusing to defend the statute.250  General Grant 
arranged for the Army to be represented by Lyman Trumbull and 
Matthew Carpenter, two Republican Senators who had played 
important roles in the consideration of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.251  To illustrate the depths to which the Court had 
become embroiled in the fight over Reconstruction, one of the 
days of oral argument was interrupted when Chief Justice Chase 
had to leave to preside over the organization of President 
Johnson’s impeachment trial in the Senate.252 
Reports from oral argument suggested that the Court was 
sympathetic to McCardle’s argument that the Reconstruction Act 
violated Milligan.253  Congress responded swiftly.  In January 
and February of 1868, it considered legislation requiring that six 
Justices agree before the Court could strike down federal 
legislation.254  The House passed the bill, but the Senate could 
not reach a consensus.255  However, after the end of oral 
argument in McCardle, Congress overrode President Johnson’s 
veto and removed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus appeals under the 1867 statute.256  Only after 
Johnson’s acquittal, and Grant’s election to the Presidency, did 
the Court announce in 1869 that it accepted the stripping of its 
jurisdiction and would not reach the merits of the McCardle 
petition.257  Thus, Milligan became the motivating factor that led 
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to the only clear example of congressional jurisdiction-stripping 
in the Court’s history.258 
III. 
In concluding, it is worth putting forth some hypotheses 
about why the Court’s decisions in Merryman and Milligan 
sparked such sharp reactions from the political branches.  In 
Merryman, Chief Justice Taney issued a writ to President 
Lincoln, who refused to follow it—probably the only 
unambiguous example of a President of the United States 
refusing to obey an order of the federal judiciary.  Despite the 
praise for Milligan in later years, it prompted Congress to enact 
the only clear example of jurisdiction-stripping in the Court’s 
history.  Along with the Jeffersonian impeachment of Justice 
Samuel Chase259 and President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan,260 these Civil War episodes remain among the most 
direct challenges to the Supreme Court’s authority by the elected 
branches of government. 
Most of the blame surely lies with the Justices themselves.  
In Milligan, the majority could have resolved the case on the 
narrow statutory ground that the Habeas Corpus Act required 
release, an outcome that would probably have received the 
approval of a unanimous Court.  Instead, Justice Davis’s majority 
stretched to address a constitutional question with obvious 
implications for the great struggle between President Johnson 
and the Reconstruction Congress.  The Court may have believed 
that it was helping to settle the matter, but it only contributed to 
the political instability and constitutional conflict over the 
occupation of the South.  Its views did not prevail, as military 
government continued over the former states of the Confederacy 
until the Compromise of 1877 removed Union troops in exchange 
for finding Republican Rutherford Hayes the winner of the 1876 
presidential election.261  The Court would have been better served 
by following the doctrine of judicial restraint, best expressed by 
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,262 
to interpret statutory questions to avoid constitutional questions.  
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Deciding Milligan only on the application of the Habeas Corpus 
Act would have kept the Court out of a constitutional 
confrontation between the political branches that it could not 
settle. 
Merryman tells a different story.  Like Davis, Chief Justice 
Taney sought to insert the federal courts into the great 
constitutional controversy of the day.  Taney, of course, had a 
history of overreaching.  He had wanted to settle the question of 
slavery in the territories in Dred Scott, but instead only 
accelerated the movement toward Civil War.  Merryman, 
however, unlike Milligan, presented no obvious statutory or 
jurisdictional means to evade the constitutional question of 
whether the President could suspend habeas corpus during a 
period of rebellion without the consent of Congress.  Merryman 
was an American citizen held by the executive branch without 
criminal charge; he had a right to appeal to a federal court to 
require the government to explain the legal basis for his 
detention. 
Taney’s mistake was that he gave Lincoln no time to 
organize the federal government’s response to the unprecedented 
challenge of secession.  Civil War was a calamity unlike any that 
the nation had faced before or since.  Taney deliberately sought 
out a constitutional confrontation with the executive branch 
during the chaotic circumstances of the first weeks of the war, 
when the very security of the capital city was at stake.  It would 
have been understandable and reasonable if Taney had given 
President Lincoln the benefit of the doubt and allowed the 
military time to restore the security of the Baltimore-
Washington, D.C. area before pressing forward with Merryman.  
Taney, however, believed that the Supreme Court had the final 
and immediate authority to resolve the constitutional question of 
habeas suspension, regardless of the circumstances.263 
Despite their different settings, both Merryman and Milligan 
have that in common.  The terrible divisions of the Civil War, 
and the Taney Court’s role in hastening its coming, had not yet 
weaned the Justices from their attachment to judicial supremacy.  
Merryman and Milligan displayed a remarkable lack of deference 
to the political branches during wartime.  War is the subject 
under which the structural advantages of the President and 
Congress are at their height, and where the courts have the least 
competence.264  War involves unpredictability and uncertainty, 
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unforeseen circumstances, difficult tradeoffs between competing 
values, and, in a Civil War, the highest of stakes.  While some 
believe that the courts should still decide cases challenging 
government authority without taking account of wartime 
conditions, this approach ignores the costs of judicial 
intervention, not only to the war effort but also to the Court.  
Merryman and Milligan reveal the wages of judicial supremacy, 
not just to the President and Congress, but to the institution of 
the Supreme Court as well. 
